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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 35 SUMMER 1960 NUMBER 2
WASHINGTON CASE LAW- 1959
Presented below is the seventh annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue have been written by second-
year students as a part of their program to attain status as nominees
to the Law Review. The second-year students were guided in their
work by the Casenote Survey Editor of the Law Review and by vari-
ous members of the law school faculty.
The case survey issue does not represent an attempt to discuss every
Washington case decided in 1959. Rather, its purpose is to point out
those cases which, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, constitute
substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional Law-Released Time for Religious Instruction
During School Day-Constitutional Aspects of School Participation
in Religious Program. In Perry v. School Dist. No. 81,' the Washing-
ton Supreme Court ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of a
school district's release of some children during school hours to permit
them to receive religious instruction under an organized program. In a
unanimous en banc decision, the court held that the Spokane school
district violated article I, section 11 and article IX, section 4 of the
state constitution when it invited representatives of religious denomina-
tions into the schools to distribute registration cards and solicit a
"captive audience" of children to enroll in a program conducted by the
Spokane Council of Churches. Permitting instructors to make the
1154 Wash. Dec. 920, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959).
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announcements and distribute the cards was also condemned. Finding,
however, that separation of church and state does not require govern-
mental hostility towards religion, the court ruled that a school super-
intendent violates no constitutional provision when he releases a child
from school to attend religious exercises or to receive religious instruc-
tion. Shorn of school participation beyond the act of releasing the
children, the Spokane Council of Churches' "released-time" program
was allowed to continue.
The action was brought by four taxpayers and parents.' The trial
court, on a motion for summary judgment, held the program to be
constitutional. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Spokane program was primarily administered by the Spokane
Council of Churches.' Each year a representative of the Council of
Churches visited the schools in which the Council had decided to offer
the program. Either the representative or the regular classroom
teachers told the children about the religious instruction and dis-
tributed registration cards for the children to take home. Those
parents who wished their children to receive instruction in classes of
one of the designated denominations signed the card and returned it
to school. At the appointed hour, these children were released into
the care of a religious representative who transported them to classes
held outside the school. No truancy check was made nor records kept
by the school. Those children whose parents had not signed the cards
were retained in school. When enough children of a class remained,
the regular school program continued, but more often they were
engaged in some special activity or given individual help. The weekly
classes lasted about an hour. No school funds were used for the pro-
gram, although, of course, the normal expenses of operating the school
continued in the absence of the released children. The trial court
found that the services of the school staff in their share of the admin-
istration of the program, although paid for by public funds, were
within the rule of de minimis. No discrimination, coercion, compulsion,
or influence were found in the administration of the program.
Theocratic domination of secular affairs was strongly feared when
our government was being formed. This fear is largely a matter of
history today. Yet, any church activity which might be an opening
2The Upper Columbia Mission Society of Seventh Day Adventists, Inc., and the
International Religious Liberty Association entered as plaintiffs in intervention.
3 Representing: American Baptist, Disciples of Christ, Congregational, Covenant,
Lutheran, Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian, and United Presbyterian denominations.
One Catholic parish also participated.
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wedge for encroachment into secular government still arouses alarm
in many people. Social policy was thus vitally at issue in the Perry
case. The vocal elements of public opinion urged many conflicting
arguments upon the court in the form of briefs amicus curiae. The
major arguments were: (1) the program introduced religious divi-
siveness into the schools; 4 (2) the force of the school's prestige and
influence behind the program, coupled with a child's natural imita-
tiveness and tendency to conform, produced a coercive sectarian in-
fluence on the child; 5 (3) large sectarian groups were favored to the
detriment of smaller groups not able to provide premises or staff;'
(4) parents are entitled to play the primary role in shaping their
child's religious beliefs by initiating religious instruction in the home
or church;7 (5) non-Christian groups were not represented; 8 (6)
placing emphasis upon the children's religious affiliations by segregat-
ing them into different groups and releasing some while retaining
others was a denial of equal protection of the law;' (7) the program
merely aided parents in their duty to give religious training to their
children;" ° (8) the program could aid in preserving children from
juvenile delinquency and communism." There appeared to be no
disagreement as to the need for religious instruction; the disagreement
arose with regard to the propriety of a program initiated in the schools
by the churches, approaching the parents indirectly through the child,
as compared with the more traditional role of the church in providing
religious instruction after school hours, leaving initiative with the
parent.
Social policy was being shaped by the court's decision, but the
court's opinion, written by Judge Hunter, did not discuss any of the
above arguments, so the policy basis of the decision is unclear. The
opinion was confined to the specific issues raised by the appellants,
4Brief of Sam L. Levinson, Melville Oseran, Howard P. Pruzan, Bernard Swer-
land, and Solie M. Ringold as Amic Curiae, associated with the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith, Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, Spokane, 154 Wash. Dec. 920,
344 P.2d 1036 (1959), at p. 2. See also, People ex rel. McCollum v.* Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
5 Brief of Amid Curiae, supra note 4, at p. 13. See also, People ex rel. McCollum,
mupra note 4, at p 227.6 Brief of Amid Curiae, supra note 4, at p. 21.7 Brief of Amid Curiae, supra note 4, at p. 15.
8 Brief of Leonard W. Schroeter and Donald S. Voorhees as Amici Curiae, associ-
ated with the American Civil Liberties Union, Perry v. School District No. 81, Spo-
kane, 154 Wash. Dec. 920, 344 P2d 1036 (1959), at p. 8. et seq.
9 Brief of Amid Curiae, .tpra note 8 at p. 3.
10 Brief of Benjamin Kizer, Robert D. Dellwo and Kenneth E. Gemmill as Amid
Curiae, Perry, supra, at p. 9 et seq.
11 Brief of Amid Curiae, supra note 10, at p. 37.
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who argued that the program violated the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, article I, section 11 of the
Washington constitution (religious freedom), article IX, section 4 of
the Washington constitution (sectarian control and influence pro-
hibited), and RCW 28.27.010 (compulsory school attendance).
In answering the contentions concerning contravention of the United
States Constitution, 2 the Washington court cited the cases of People
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,3 and Zorach v. Clauson,4
in which the United States Supreme Court ruled on the same questions.
The Washington court, quoting extensively from the opinion of Justice
Douglas in the Zorach case, compared the released time programs in
these two cases. In the Illinois program, declared unconstitutional in
McCollum, the school classrooms were used for religious instruction,
school officials supervised and approved the religious teachers, school
authorities segregated the children by religious faiths, cards were
distributed by the school, and children were solicited for religious
instruction in the school buildings. In the Zorach case, in which the
New York program was held to be constitutional, the school activity
was limited to release of the children and the keeping of a truancy
record. The Zorach program was found not to infringe upon religious
freedom, nor to involve the expenditure of public funds, and the record
was found free from evidence of coercive administration of the pro-
gram.'5 Justice Douglas reasoned that, although separation of church
and state must be complete, there is no need for the state to be hostile
to religion. Therefore, the schools can properly release children to
attend religious exercises or receive religious instruction.
It will be seen that the Spokane program combined some of the
features of both the Illinois and the New York programs. The Wash-
ington court found the Zorach reasoning persuasive and controlling in
Perry, insofar as the facts of the Zorach program were applicable to
the Spokane program. The court pointed out, however, that the dis-
tribution of cards and the soliciting of pupils, which was a part of the
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. ." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
13 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
14 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
15 In the Zorach case, proffered evidence of coercion and discrimination was ex-
cluded at the trial court level because of non-compliance with state procedure. Thus
the issue of coercive influence upon the child was not before the Supreme Court.
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Spokane system, was absent from the Zorack program; yet these
practices were among those present in the objectionable McCollum
program. No opinion was expressed by the Washington court as to
whether these practices alone would violate the federal constitution.
The condemnation of these practices was based rather upon their
contravention of the Washington constitution, as will be discussed
later.
The appellants also contended that the release of the children in
the program disrupted the classroom instruction of the non-released
children, to their detriment, and thus violated the federal guarantee
of equal protection of the laws. The court rejected this contention,
saying it found no support in the record; that, on the contrary, indi-
vidual help and special activities were provided for the non-released
children. The record does not make clear the nature of these special
activities, nor whether all the children remaining were in need of extra
help. It seems reasonable to suppose that the school would refrain
from introducing new material or teaching important subjects while
many of the children were gone. Therefore, it is probable that the
special activities were in the nature of "busy work." The court's
decision concerning the allegation that instruction was disrupted might
have been different if the record had been more detailed regarding the
activities of those remaining at school.
The appellants had case authority to support their contention that
the program violated article I, section 11 of the Washington consti-
tution, which reads in part:
No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any
religious establishment. 6
This constitutional provision has consistently been strictly construed
by the court. In State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier,17 the Washington court
pointed out that this provision is "sweeping and comprehensive" and
goes further than any other state constitution in marking off the wall
between church and state. In that case, the court held unconstitutional
a program whereby school credit was to be given for Bible study out-
16WAsH. CoNsT. art. I, § 11 (as amended by amendment 4) : "Religious Freedom.
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and wor-
ship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed
in person or property on account of religion .... No public money or property shall
be appropriated for, or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment. . .
17 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35 (1918).
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side the school, after a school examination. The program was held to
be a violation of article I, section 11 because it was a use of public
funds, in direct contravention of the clear language of the section,
because the school would become involved in religious controversy if
it administered such a program, and because not only sectarian instruc-
tion was proscribed, but also religious instruction per se. Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist. No. 50618 stressed that the provisions of
the Washington constitution concerning religious freedom go further
than do those of the United States Constitution. That the same strict
construction would be applied when a released time program came
before the court was foreseeable. 9 The distribution of cards and the
announcements made under the Spokane program were found to in-
volve a "use of school facilities supported by public funds for the
promotion of a religious program," and so were in violation of article I,
section 11. That the de minimis argument relied on by the trial court
was not acceptable to the Supreme Court had already been indicated
in Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 201.20 The fact that the
program was allowed to continue, with the limitation that the con-
demned practices must cease, may represent a slight softening of the
previous strict approach.
These practices, involving actual participation in the religious pro-
gram by the schools, were also found to be within the prohibition of
article IX, section 4 of the state constitution.2 The effect of permitting
the children to be addressed in behalf of the program while assembled
in the classroom as a "captive audience," said the court, was to subject
them to a sectarian influence.
How does the Washington position compare with that of other
states? The Washington constitution prohibits not only sectarian
control, but also sectarian influence.22 It is this language which
18 33 Wn2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949).
19 Note, 28 WASH. L. REv. 156 (1953).
20 17 Wn.2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943). The court said, at p. 66, "Whether the ex-
pense be small or great, is, of course, no justification for the use of common school
funds for other than common school purposes."
21 WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 4: "Sectarian Control or Influence Prohibited. All
schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever
free from sectarian control or influence."
22 Judge Weaver wrote a concurring opinion in Perry to point out that the word
"influence" in article IX, section 4, was deliberately retained by the framers of the
constitution in spite of an attempt to remove it and thus weaken the language. In
view of the language and purpose of this section, rather slight evidence could be con-
sidered sufficient to show "influence," such as comment by a teacher concerning par-
ticipation in the religious program, or emphasis upon religious differences by segregat-
ing the children according to religious affiliation preparatory to releasing them to their
various classes.
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requires a stricter construction of the Washington constitution than
is given to the constitution of other states. A comparison of the Perry
case with two cases from other states is illuminating. An extremely
broad interpretation of a state constitutional provision is found in a
California case, Gordon v. Board of Educ., where school participation
was an integral part of the program." The California court found the
program to be constitutional, remarking that the family, as a unit, has
failed to do its part in this field of education. The program in a New
York case, People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves,24 involved less school par-
ticipation than did the program in the California case, but more than
in the Washington program. The New York court found that the acts
involved were "trivial and remote, not invoking constitutional ques-
tions." It is apparent that the ruling in Perry, while it may represent
a slight lowering of the wall between church and state, which the
Washington court has hitherto maintained impregnable, stops short
of permitting the degree of joint church and school action sanctioned
by some state courts.
The final contention of the appellants that the program violated
the compulsory school attendance statute, RCW 28.27.010," required
an interpretation of a section hitherto unconstrued. To the argument
that the statute required attendance in public or private school for
the full time when the school is in session, the court replied that the
release of children under the Spokane program was within the discre-
tion of the district superintendent. This discretion was given him by
the clause of the statute authorizing him to excuse a child from school
attendance "for any sufficient reason." No previous ruling on this
aspect of the clause appears to have been made by the court. An
attorney general's opinion26 had expressed the firm belief that the
. 23 Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal.App.2d 464, 178 P.2d 488 (1947). The program
under scrutiny in the Gordon case featured expenditure of public school funds for the
preparation of informational literature about the program and for the printing of cards,
supervision of the program by school staff, segregation of the children according to
religious faiths prior to their release to classes outside the school grounds, and the
keeping of attendance records. The teachers had the option of continuing to teach the
retained children, or not, according to their preference.
24 219 N.Y.S. 189 (1927). Under this New York program, children could be re-
leased upon parental request for the last thirty minutes of each Wednesday, a regular
study period, cards not prepared by the school were distributed in the classrooms, and
a truancy check was made.
25 RCW 28.27.010: "All parents ...shall cause such child to attend the public
school of the district in which the child resides for the full time when the school is in
session or to attend a private school for the same time.
"The superintendent of the schools of the district in which the child resides, or the
county superintendent if there is no district superintendent, may excuse a child from
such attendance if the child is physically or mentally unable to attend school . . .or
for any other sufficient reason."261921-1922 Ops. Atty. Gen. 196.
19601
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
clauses antecedent to the "any sufficient reason" clause, dealing as
they do with complete excuse from school attendance for mental and
physical reasons or because the child has completed eighth grade, indi-
cated that the "any sufficient reason" clause also referred to complete
excuse from attendance and not to sporadic release for religious in-
struction. The Court's interpretation of RCW 28.27.010, authorizing
sporadic release, promotes speculation.
The question of interest now is what will constitute a "sufficient
reason" in future cases which may arise. The court has said that
participation in a program of religious instruction constitutes a suffi-
cient reason to release children from school. Can it be presumed that
a child would be released for religious instruction given by a sect not
participating in the program of the Council of Churches? Equal pro-
tection issues would certainly be raised if release were denied. Would
classes given by a creedless spiritual fellowship group, devoted to high
ethical and moral principles, merit the release of children for "re-
ligious" instruction? Or, if a group of parents, not acting through any
organized sect or denomination, wished to offer classes in comparative
religion of today and ethical philosophies of the past, would such
classes merit release of a child for religious instruction? If not, would
they constitute "sufficient reason," as valuable instruction in things
of the spirit which is not permitted in the public schools? Would a
child be released to watch a motion-picture depicting the producer's
version of Biblical events? These questions could arise as parents and
others become aware of the court's interpretation of the compulsory
school attendance statute.
The opinion in State ex. rel. Dearle v. Frazier,7 showed that the
prospect of public schools ever becoming embroiled in religious con-
troversies was shocking to the court. The words of Justice Jackson,
dissenting in the Zoracl case " also seem pertinent:
[I]f we concede to the State power and wisdom to single out
"duly constituted religious" bodies as exclusive alternatives for com-
pulsory secular instruction, it would be logical to also uphold the power
and wisdom to choose the true faith among those "duly constituted."
If the school authorities of Washington are ever required to answer
the questions posed above, they will enter a controversial area. One
solution would be to excuse all children at a certain hour of the week,
preferably towards the close of a school day, with no questions asked
2T7 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35 (1918).
28 343 U.S. 306, at 325 (1952).
[VoL. 35
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by the school as to how the time is used. The latter solution is equiva-
lent to the "dismissed time" program, reported to be in use in France. 9
It could satisfy the desires of parents who believe the week-end affords
insufficient time for religious instruction and who seek an hour of the
child's school week for that purpose; yet it would avoid embroiling
the state, through the schools, in affairs of religion sacred to the
conscience of the individual. The Washington compulsory school
attendance statute does not specify any fixed number of hours for
the school week; but whether the court's interpretation of "any
sufficient reason" would stretch to include such a program cannot
be foreseen.
Although the policy behind the decision is not clear, the Perry case
appears to align the Washington court with the body of authority
represented by Meyer v. Nebraska,"0 which recognizes that primary
interest and responsibility for providing religious instruction for chil-
dren lies with their parents. JoYcE M. THomAs
Constitutional Law-Compulsory School Attendance Law-Free-
dom of Religion. In the recent case of State ex rel. Shoreline School
Dist. v. Superior Court,1 the Washington Supreme Court reversed a
finding of the juvenile court that the best interests of a dependent
child dictated that she not be required to attend a formal school, and
summarily dismissed the parents' assertion that requiring the child to
attend school infringed their freedom of religion.
The parents and the child, a thirteen-year-old girl, belong to a small
religious sect which includes among its prohibitions the eating of meat,
fish, or fowl, or being in a room where the same is being eaten; play-
ing or listening to musical instruments; cutting the hair. Because of
normal grade school activities, the girl experienced a series of con-
flicting demands and was at times subjected to ridicule.' The parents,
without permission from school authorities, kept the child from school
and taught her in their home. The juvenile court found that the qual-
ity of the home education was at least equal to that offered at the
public school and that the child's attainments were above average.
The course of study in the home, the books and devices used, and the
29 See State ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (concurring opinion).
3 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also, Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
1155 Wash. Dec. 175, 346 P.2d 999 (1959).
2 Brief of Relator, State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court, 155 Wash.
Dec. 175, 346 P.2d 999 (1959).
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manner and time of teaching were comparable to the public school
procedures. The juvenile court found that the interests of the child
would be best served by allowing her to remain at home, subject to
the continuing supervision of the court.
Reduced to its simplest form, the reason given by the supreme court
for reversing the decision was that the home instruction was not and
could not be a private school, and therefore the ruling of the juvenile
court conflicted with the compulsory school attendance law,' its de-
cision about the welfare of the child being of no import.
The reason given for the conclusion that the system of home in-
struction employed here could not qualify as a private school was that
the mother, who did all the teaching, did not have a state teaching
certificate. The court stated: "There is one standard which the legis-
lature made applicable to all schools, both public and private, and that
standard is that the teacher must be qualified to teach and hold a
teaching certificate."4 The court then quoted a section from Wash.
Sess. Laws 1909, which says that to be a qualified teacher within the
meaning of the school law one must have a valid state teacher's cer-
tificate or diploma.5
The statement by the court is subject to question. The chapter
quoted from relates to the establishment of a "general and uniform
public school system," and title III is labeled "General Common School
System." The act as a whole is aimed at setting up a system of public
instruction, and the terms "schools" and "common schools" seem to
be used interchangeably. Where the act was intended to include pri-
vate schools, that intent was made unmistakable.6 Indications that
the requirement of certification was not to extend to private school
teachers are found in the duty of the Superintendent of Public In-
struction to keep a directory "of all teachers receiving certificates to
teach in the common schools of this state,"' while no provision is made
for records of private school teachers' certificates; the duty of the
county auditor to "countersign... warrants for the payment of all
3 RCW 28.27.010.
4 155 Wash. Dec. 175, 180, 346 P.2d 999 (1959).
5 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 97, title III, subchapter 4, art. VII, § 1: "No person
shall be accounted as a qualified teacher within the meaning of the school law, who is
not the holder of a valid teacher's certificate or diploma issued by lawful authority of
this state."
This section is not codified in the Revised Code of Washington, although a very brief
condensation of it is incorporated into RCW 28.67.010.
6 For example, RCW 43.11.030(10) refers to "every educational institution in this
state."
7 RCW 43.11.030(11).
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teachers' salaries"' (a statement that is as inclusive by its bare lan-
guage as the section relied on by the court, but one hardly applicable
to private school teachers); and the fact that the certificates them-
selves are classified as "common school certificates" or "city certifi-
cates"9 (issued by the larger cities which desire a closer control over
teacher qualifications10). It is extremely doubtful that the section
quoted by the court was intended to apply to private as well as public
schools.r '
In MacKenzie v. State,2 which antedated the 1909 act, a substan-
tially similar act of 18978 was in effect. The 1897 act had a section 4
which was almost identical to the language quoted in the present case,"
and the context was essentially the same. In answering an allegation
that the section was applicable to teachers in state normal schools,
the court there said that the holding of a certificate "is limited by the
terms of the act to teachers under the common-school system."' 6
In the Shoreline opinion, the court also relied on an early Wash-
ington case, State v. Counort,' in which a father was prosecuted for
not sending his children to school. In affirming the conviction the
Washington Supreme Court said: "The parent who teaches his chil-
dren at home, whatever be his reason for desiring to do so, does not
maintain such a [private] school."' Had the earlier court stopped at
that point, there would be good reason for asserting that it is a clearly
apposite precedent which the court could follow.' But the Counort
opinion goes on to say:
Undoubtedly a private school may be maintained in a private home in
8 RCW 28.66.040.
9 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 97, title III, subchapter 12, art. III.
'
0 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 97, title III, subchapter 12, art. V.
11 Additional indications that the reference to certificates was not intended to extend
to private school teachers are found in RICW 28.67.070; RCW 43.11.030 (3) ; RCWr
43.11.030 (12) ; and Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 97, title III, subchapter 12, art. 1, § 3(codified in part in RCW 28.70.110).
1232 Wash. 657, 73 Pac. 889 (1903).
13 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 118.
14Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, c. 118, § 51.
15 "No person shall be accounted as a qualified teacher, within the meaning of the
school law, who has not first received a certificate issued by the superintendent of
public instruction...."
'6 MacKenzie v. State, 32 Wash. 657, 668, 73 Pac. 889, (1903).
1769 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910 (1912).
18 Id. at 364, 124 Pac. at 912.
19 The Couiort case was also cited for the proposition that home instruction cannot
be a private school in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950), and State
v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 Atl. 170 (1929). For cases contrary to Cannort, see People
v. Levisen, supra, and State v. Peterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550 (1904), both
criticized in People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P2d 685 (1953). See also
Annot, 14 A.L.R.2d 1369 (1950).
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which the children of the instructor may be pupils. This provision of
the law is not to be determined by the place where the school is main-
tained, nor the individuality or number of the pupils who attend it.
It is to be determined by the purpose, intent and character of the
endeavor. The evidence of the state was to the effect that appellant
maintained no school at his home; that his two little girls could be seen
playing about the house at all times during the ordinary school hours.
20
[Emphasis added.]
This language is favorable to the parents in the Shoreline case, not to
the state or the position of the court. Precisely what the Counort
court had in mind as the basis for its decision is not clear; but it ap-
pears to have been strongly influenced by the fact that the children
were not receiving the education required by law.
If the broad language in the Shoreline case is followed in the future,
the impact on the private schools in Washington, many of which have
a large proportion of uncertified teachers, will be substantial. The
issue of certification was not argued in the briefs. It is believed that
upon a more detailed investigation the court will return to its position
in MacKenzie v. State.2'
The manner in which the court dealt with the authority of school
superintendents to waive the compulsory attendance requirements
merits some discussion. RCW 28.27.01022 says that parents must send
their children to a public school or to a private school unless excused
by the district school superintendent because of certain achievements
or defects "or for some other sufficient reason." Proof of absence
from public schools or approved private school is declared to be prima
facie evidence of a violation of the section. It is to be noted that the
only reference to an "approved" private school is in the statutory
creation of a rule of evidence. The requirement, which the superin-
tendent may waive, is to attend a public school "or to attend a private
school." However, the court said that the superintendent may excuse
20 69 Wash. 361, 364, 124 Pac. 910, 911 (1912).
2132 Wash. 657, 73 Pac. 889 (1903).
22 "All parents ... having or who may hereafter have immediate custody of any child
between eight and fifteen years of age.., shall cause such child to attend the public
school of the district, in which the child resides, for the full time when such school may
be in session or to attend a private school for the same time, unless the superintendent
of the schools of the district in which the child resides ... shall have excused such child
from attendance because the child is physically or mentally unable to attend school or
has already attained a reasonable proficiency in the [subject matter] ... or for some
other sufficient reason. Proof of absence from public schools or approved private school
shall be prian facie evidence of a violation of this section." Wash. Sess. Laws 1909,
c. 97, title III, subchapter 16, § 1. The language of RCW 28.27.010, which is based on
this section, differs from the foregoing quotation in some immaterial respects.
[VOL. 35
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persons not attending public schools "provided such child was attend-
ing an 'approved private school'.. 23  [Emphasis added.]
This construction appears to be too narrow. If "other sufficient
reason" for which children may be excused from public school attend-
ance is restricted to attendance at an "approved" private school, the
superintendent is deprived of any exercise of discretion in excusing
children even though such discretion is necessarily implied in the
phrase.24 The dissenting opinion in the Shoreline case suggests a num-
ber of instances in which children probably should be excused from
attendance at any school.25 If the supreme court adheres to its con-
struction of RCW 28.27.010, some sort of established institution must
be found for all children not specifically excusable, regardless of how
psychologically unfit for attendance they may be.
23 155 Wash. Dec. 175, 180, 346 P.2d 999, 1002 (1959).24 An indication that the court did not mean what it said in its extremely restrictive
construction is found in the slightly earlier case of Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, 154
Wash. Dec. 920, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959). In that case it was held that releasing pupils
for religious instruction was a proper exercise of the school superintendent's authority
under the "any other sufficient reason" clause of the statute. It is unlikely that the
court would reverse itself so quickly, and without comment, had it given serious con-
sideration to the implications of what it was saying. The Perry case is discussed in the
preceding Casenote.
Nor did the Shoreline opinion say that school superintendents are deprived of all
discretion. The decision whether a school is in fact a private school is said by the court
still to be discretionary, and it infers from the statute that the decision-making authority
has been delegated to the superintendent. As to standards for guiding the decision, the
court said: "Although the legislature did not expressly provide that all of the legisla-
tive standards for a public common school must be maintained by a private school in
order to qualify as such, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that the
one to whom it had delegated the power and authority to determine whether a child
was attending a qualified private school would be guided in that decision by the mini-
mum standards required by the legislature for a public common school." 155 Wash.
Dec. 175, 182 (1959).
The quoted matter was followed by citation of a number of statutes: RCW 28.02.020(administrative officers of public schools) ; RCW 28.02.030 (display of flag and pledge
of allegiance); RCW 28.02.070 (Armistice and Admission Day programs); RCW
28.02.080 (study of state and federal constitutions--specifically made applicable to pri-
vate schools) ; RCW 28.02.090 (Temperance and Good Citizenship Day observance) ;
RCW 28.05.030 (physical education); RCW 28.05.050 (history course); and Wash.
Sess. Laws 1909, c. 97, title III, subchapter 1, § 2, a condensed version of which is
codified in RCW 28.05.010-28.05.020 (basic required courses). Length of school day
and school year are found in RCW 28.01.010.
It may be noted that the court's statement is based on its preceding decision that the
superintendent of schools is the person who is to decide what is an approved private
school. Regardless of who is to make the final decision, relevant standards required of
public schools would be useful criteria in seeing if the aims of the public in the educa-
tion of its citizens, as reflected by legislation, are being satisfied.
25 "The fallacy of relator's position can be illustrated by considering some of the
routine problems which confront a juvenile court: The delinquent or dependent child
within the compulsory school attendance age who, by his prolonged absence from school,
is too far behind his age group to permit a school adjustment; or such child who is
mentally incapable of adjusting in a public school; or such child who is a criminal of-
fender; or such child who is incorrigible and refuses to submit to school discipline; or,
as in this case, such child who, because of certain religious principles, refuses to obey
instructions and is a misfit in any school." 155 Wash. Dec. 175, 186, 346 P.2d 999, 1005
(dissenting opinion).
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Construction of the "approval" aspect was raised in State v. Coun-
ort.2 '6 The court there pointed out that:
The statute does not, in the first instance, provide that the private
school shall be an approved one. The gist of the offense is in the fail-
ure to attend any school, either public or private, without having ob-
tained an excuse for such failure from the superintendent of schools.1
7
[Emphasis added.]
This is the better construction. The statute seems to say that one's
child must attend one kind of school or the other. If he chooses a
private school, he may or may not be within the statutory require-
ment. If the private school is not an "approved" one, he must over-
come the prima facie evidence against him, but with adequate proof
he can overcome it.28 The Shoreline case converts the prima facie evi-
dence to conclusive evidence.
A surprising aspect of the Shoreline decision is the effect on the juve-
nile court of determinations made by school superintendents. The
superintendent of the Shoreline School District clearly felt that the
child involved in the present case was not attending a private school
within the meaning of the compulsory school attendance law. The
juvenile court concluded "that the welfare of said child will best be
served"29 by allowing the home instruction to continue. The holding
of the supreme court, in reversing the related part of the ensuing
order, in effect subordinates the juvenile court's power to deal with
the welfare of children in this respect to the seemingly exclusive power
of school superintendents.
The juvenile court was created in 1909.0 At that time the defini-
tions of dependent and delinquent children, and hence the jurisdiction
of the court, did not include truants. In 1913" the scope of "depend-
ent child" was enlarged to include one "who is an habitual truant, as
defined in the school laws of the state of Washington." 2 Also in 1913
the juvenile court was given power to make "any order, which in the
judgment of the court, would promote the child's health and welfare.'
26 69 Wash. 361, 124 Pac. 910 (1912).
27 Id. at 363, 124 Pac. at 911.
28 This task, of course, is separate from determining whether the child is attending
a private school of any sort.
29 Brief of Relator, p. 44, State ex rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court, 155
Wash. Dec. 175, 346 P.2d 999 (1959).
30 Wash. Sess. Laws 1909, c. 190; now codified in RCW c. 13.04.
31 Wash. Sess. Laws 1913, c. 160; now codified as RCW 13.04.010.
32 RCW 13.04.010 (14).
33 RCW 13.04.090.
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Presumably, any conflict between the compulsory school attendance
law and the juvenile court law would be resolved in favor of the latter,
because of the later amendment. This reasoning would give the juve-
nile court authority to issue orders for the welfare of truants. The
decision of the Shoreline case severely restricts that authority and sub-
ordinates it to the decisions of local school superintendents based on
private school, rather than individual welfare, criteria.
The constitutional argument raised in the Shoreline case was dis-
missed with the statement that "religious beliefs, whatever they may
be, are not a legal justification for violation of positive law.""4 It is
believed that a much firmer ground can be found for the denial of the
constitutional issue.
The protection of religion in the first amendment to the federal
constitution" has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendmen36
and is therefore applicable to the states. The prohibition does not li-
cense all kinds of conduct or refusal to conform because of religious
beliefs. "[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be."3" The interest to be balanced against
the desirability of religious freedom is the protection and achievement
of legitimate state objectives."8 The balancing process includes an in-
quiry into the reasonable alternatives that are available both to the
state in seeking its ends and the individual in the free exercise of his
beliefs.3 The requirement of a "clear and present danger" to the state
if the prohibited act is allowed was first employed in free speech
cases." The test has tentatively been adapted to freedom of religion
84 155 Wash. Dec. 175, 183, 346 P.2d 999, 1004 (1959). The statement is clearly too
broad. A "positive law" could purport to prohibit any number of protected activities.35"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof...."
36 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
3r Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
38 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
39 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Despite Justice Frankfurter's protesta-
tions (see his concurring opinion in the Kovacs case), many Supreme Court opinions
have reflected the feeling that the guarantees of personal freedom enjoy a "preferred
position" and that legislation interfering with them will more easily be upset than other
legislation challenged on constitutional grounds.
40 The term was first used by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). It has subsequently been employed in a number of cases. See CONSnI-
TUTION OF TH Uxrnis STATEs, ANN., 772-92 (Corwin, 1953). An analysis of the
actual fact situations which have been held to satisfy the clear and present danger
requirement indicates that the danger need not be especially clear or present. In the
Schenck case itself, the likelihood that the defendant's conduct would cause any tangible
obstruction of the government's interest was, at most, remote.
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cases by the United States Supreme Court4 in a few instances and
has specifically been applied by the Washington Supreme Court in a
religion case."
The special interest of the state which prompted passage of the
compulsory school attendance law is to have its children well enough
educated to become responsible members of society. This interest has
been held elsewhere to be strong enough to override a positive religious
tenet that children over a certain age should receive no secular edu-
cation;43 a fortiori, receipt of an education that is inadequate by rea-
sonable minimum standards cannot be sustained on religious grounds.4
An argument that the state may properly prohibit home instruction
in lieu of attendance at a more formal school could be based on the
difficulty of supervising the quality of the instruction. In an isolated
case there would not be much difficulty, but if the practice were al-
lowed to become widespread, state control would, as a practical mat-
ter, be impossible.45 Argument to the contrary could be two-pronged:
the state could administer a series of tests to keep check on the prog-
ress of the children, and there is little likelihood of the supervision's
becoming burdensome because few people have such unusual religious
beliefs that they would be precluded from attendance at a regularly
conducted school. The latter argument could invoke the "clear and
present danger" test-there is no clear and present danger that the
state would have an incompetent citizenry because a few children were
taught at home (but perhaps there is a clear and present danger that
the home-taught child will become an incompetent citizen).
An additional consideration favoring school attendance is the proc-
ess of learning to adjust to society. The child whose contact with
others is limited to a small group is less well prepared for the conflicts
he will encounter in the future.
The state cannot require children to attend public schools.46 The
alternatives are to allow attendance at private schools and to allow
private instruction. Washington has not chosen to provide specifi-
cally for private tutoring by persons of acknowledged competence.
For the child involved in the Shoreline case, the allowable alternative
41 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
42 State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wn.2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
43 Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
44 People v. Donner, 302 N.Y. 857, 110 N.E.2d 48 (1951).
45 The opinion in State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 At. 170 (1929), presents a useful
discussion of this point.
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to public schooling is attendance at an approved private school (under
the court's interpretation of the statute). It seems very probable that
a child who must avoid music, dancing, and lunch rooms could never-
theless find a private school that would make acceptable arrangements.
Under these facts, it is doubtful that the child's position is extreme
enough to lead to a finding that the compulsory school attendance law
is unconstitutional as applied to her. The alternatives are not un-
reasonable. A stronger case would be made out for one whose religious
beliefs bar association with large groups.47 In such a case, the state
could very well be required to take the next step in loosening control,
the allowance of private tutoring. TMoTHY R. CLiFFOIR
CONTRACTS
Contracts - Consideration - Promise to Perform Duty. The
Washington court, in the recent case of Reynolds v. Hancock,1 abruptly
disposed of a very complicated problem. Performance by a promisee
of a duty already owed to a third person was held not to be sufficient
consideration.
The defendant, a prospective home purchaser, became interested in
a house in Seattle owned by persons residing in another state and
signed an earnest-money agreement form furnished by the plaintiff, a
real estate broker. The plaintiff's commission was to be paid by the
owners. The printed form contained a provision which recited that the
purchaser promised the real estate broker not to revoke his offer for
a certain period of time in "consideration of agent submitting this
offer to seller...."
Before the form reached the owners for acceptance, the defendant
sent a telegram to them revoking the offer, thereby precluding the for-
mation of a contract to sell. The plaintiff sued on the above provision
in an action for breach of contract, to recover the commission that
would have been received from the owner if the sale had been com-
pleted.
The court, without citing any previous decisions or discussing the
theoretical problems involved, summarily confirmed the trial court's
46 Pierce v. Society of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
47This situation arose in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950),
where the parents, Seventh Day Adventists, believed that school atmosphere led to
pugnaciousness in children and inhibited their receptiveness to the teachings of the
Bible. The case was not expressly decided on the constitutional ground, however. The
court construed its compulsory school law to allow home instruction.
153 Wn2d 682, 335 P.2d 817 (1959).
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